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Don't look at me…I do what he does — just slower. #rstats avuncular • ?Resistance Fighter • Cook • Christian • [Master] Chef des Données de Sécurité @ @rapid7

With Gizmodo doing a post hyping Mountain Lion’s new dictation feature it’s probably a good time to note that folks in regulated environments or who just care about security & privacy a bit more than others should not enable or use this feature for the dictation of sensitive information.

From Apple’s own warning on the matter:

When you use the keyboard dictation feature on your computer, the things you dictate will be recorded and sent to Apple to convert what you say into text. Your computer will also send Apple other information, such as your first name and nickname; and the names, nicknames, and relationship with you (for example, “my dad”) of your address book contacts. All of this data is used to help the dictation feature understand you better and recognize what you say. Your User Data is not linked to other data that Apple may have from your use of other Apple services.

It’s much like what happens with Siri, Dragon Dictation or a myriad of other iOS and modern desktop apps/browser extensions. Thankfully, it performs the transfers over SSL, but that still won’t help you if your dictating health, financial or other regulated/NPPI/PII data.

While the feature is cool and does work pretty well, it’s important to make sure you and your users know what it does, how it works and where they can/cannot use it.

I had a few moments this past weekend to play with an idea for visualizing the passwords used against the honeypot @jayjacobs set up. While it’s not as informative as Jay’s weekend endeavors:

it is pretty, and it satisfied my need to make a word cloud out of useful data.

The image below is of the top 500 passwords used against the honeypot and requires an SVG-capable browser and also requires horizontal scrolling, so you can view or download it standalone if there are any issues. For those generally SVG-challenged, there’s also a slightly less #spiffy PNG version to view as well.

123456password123412312345112testtest123qwertyabc1231234567passwdp@ssw0rd1qaz2wsxPassword1231q2w3e123qwebranburicarOOtoracleqazwsx111111@#$%redhat0000usertester1111passabcwww123456781q2w3e4r123456789passw0rdadminroot123mastermailr00tabcd1234Password1postgrestempwebftptooralexaaaasdfbillssadmin123linuxasdfgh123qaz123456qwertyMySQLpa55w0rdwebadminq1w2e3r4pass123zxcvbnm0724939114654321123123qwe123testingtesttestserver7hur@y@t3am$#@apachetemp123mucleuscacarootdiffiehellmangroupexchangesha11234567890administratorwebmasterokmnjichangemeqwertyuiop000000BUNdAS@#$RT%GQEQW#%QWvkvadaclasa1qaz2wsx3edcp4ssw0rdrootrootcarto0ns11backupguestq1w2e3alupiguszaq12wsxdiana4everworlddominationstudentadmin1test1ftpuserdkagh@#$Pa$$w0rddoarmata86abc1234123abcP@$$w0rdnagiosabcdefdavidinternetinfodemooracle12312qwaszxCiuciuka321michaelprivateletmeinqazwsxedc1qa2ws3edaicuminesirhack123qweqweroot123456cacutzaasdf1234andrewadrian140489root1234diaconusanduborissoxy1welcome510326mazdaasd123wwwdatametallicaTkdghkxkd_salesqwer1234scricideeapruebarichard1ntll1tch1qaz@WSXasdfghjklpublic1qa2wsjohntomcatKiliN6#Th3Ph03$%nix@NdR3birDmysql123iamh4ckst4rf0r3verroutermanageramandaguest123web123shellaceraspire1QAZXSW2testesysadmin11111jamesserver1cyrusinfo123defaultFum4tulP0@t3Uc1d3R4uD3T0t@#$%%supportrobertqwerty123user123jessicafedoranobody2wsx3edctindoor355postmaster6gy7cgq1w2e3r4t5zxcvbnchris1234qwerQAZ2wsx0933353329root123451q2w3e4r5tnicolehttptest1234paulp@sswordsamsungdanutzaa1postfixoracle1it00zsystemdanielaccesswilliamcomputerqazwsx123root1dataasteriskzh3I5LiK3P4rtY@v3rsonny2hack121212mikeqnlkOF2NV71qaz2wsx3edc4rfvssh4georgejoshua123surusanetworkP@55W0RDtestuserroxiroxikentr890httpdqweasdzxcannaQWEASDr00t12354321salajan123sex4s3xyg4ymnbvcxzsnow786just188uniserverroot2145pass1234qweraaaaaa1q2w3e4r5t6yroot@#serviceemaildannysex4plplbrianserver123trash1qazse4newsabcdefgzaq123camels1alanrwwtxadmfalcon#7364angeleltmzmdnjao123@#$gamesdkaghzexzexunixadamfranknimdaclamavambersecretvmwareroot01libraryoffice321graciesquidsarah@#visitorstevenmarychinadavejackjeanoliverpass1danjulietest2benreagancarlyxxxfredtim666sammarkasduser1faxnicktsbinmaxgrace%s4kural0v3iloveyou123321ubuntudarwinkevinbrett

Brylcream? Check.
Decked out in your best Frankie Avalon or Annette Funicello beach fashions? Check.

Now, polish up your cruiser and get ready ‘cuz @GraniteSec is heading back to Fort Foster [info] [map] at Kittery Point, Maine for it’s fifth family & friends tweetup!

We can’t promise mermaids or sky-diving surfers, but you’re sure to have a groovy time hanging loose and chowing down with other hip cats & chicks.

For all the low down, check out granitesec.org (redirect to the latest tweetup Eventbrite page forthcoming) or rap with @hrbrmstr, @ITSecurity or @1_tjw on Twitter.

(And, if any of you younger cats are having trouble with the lingo/references, check this out, man…)

Also, if you want to help promote the tweetup, you can use the above 500x350px graphic or this 160x400px graphic and link to this post or http://granitesec.org/ which will have an Eventbrite redirect up in the near future.

(With apologies to Barry McGuire & P.F. Sloan)

To a familiar tune

RIM of Destruction

The mobile world, it is explodin’
executives flarin’, app updates loadin’
you’re Bold’s enough to sell but no one’s buyin’
no one believes in your PlayBook, but that’s what your totin’
and even the Curve won’t keep you a floatin’
but you tell us over and over and over again my friend,
ah you don’t believe you’re on the RIM of destruction.

Don’t you understand, what I’m trying to say?
Can’t you see the fears that I’m feeling today?
Your consumer and business customers are all running away,
There’ll be nothing to save with QNX in a grave,
take a look around you, Bidulka, it’s bound to scare ya,
and Thorsten tells us over and over and over again Boulben,
ah, he don’t believe he’s on the RIM of destruction.

BYOD’s got me so mad, my blood’s coagulatin’,
I’m tweeting here (from my iPhone), just contemplatin’,
I can’t twist the truth, it knows no regulation,
that iOS & Android are wildly propagatin’
and BB10 promises alone can’t bring integration,
when platform respect is disintegratin’,
this whole mobile world is just too frustratin’,
and you tell us over and over and over again my friend,
ah, you don’t believe you’re on the RIM of destruction.

Think of all the Samsung phones in China,
iOS is on top even in Redmond, WA!,
Ah, you may think you’re a leader in this space,
but you keep returning to that same old place,
your quarterly reports show no pride, just disgrace,
you buried your heads, and soon there won’t be a trace (of you),
copy your neighbours, who’ve all taken your place,
and you tell us over and over and over and over again my friend,
you don’t believe you’re on the RIM of destruction.
no no you don’t believe you’re on the RIM of destruction.

For this post (and probably a few subsequent ones), I’m taking the role of ‘Pinky” to @jayjacobs’ ‘Brain’ as I share some of my own analysis on the ssh honeypot passwords that Jay collected (you’ll need to read his VZB post before continuing). There are tons of angles for analysis and I’ve been all over the place as ideas have come & gone. I’m probably not breaking much (if any) new ground as there are a number of honeypot tools that provide #spiffy reports like this, but there may be some new insights or at the very least some starting points for folks new to the honeypot scene.

One of the first things I did with the data was to make a histogram of the password lengths the attackers used:


Some questions come up:

  • Why 6 & 8 as the most frequent?
  • What’s up with “khaled-dico-ana-wla-akhou-charmouta-tfeh-kess-ekhtak-bi-ayri-a5ou-a7beh”(the longest one), “FSDwef8529637531598273k1d123kid871kid872tralalalovedolce” and the other large passwords? Are they used in conjunction with other attack vectors (one of my posits)? Are they vanity signatures to inject into honeypots (one of Jay’s posits)

(btw: those are legit questions…if honeypot researchers know the answers, I am curious)

When looking at sources of these attacks, they seem to be concentrated in a few areas:

The brute-forcers also do not seem to rest (click for larger version):

The down days are when they honeypot was, well, down. I am curious as to what caused the surge on the 31st & the 3rd? I believe that actually maps to Fri/Mon if the source is China/Russia.

In the coming days/weeks, I’ll break down some analytics by IP address and focus a bit more on the passwords themselves.

UPDATE: I had to remove the Google Insight widgets and replace them with static images. There was inconsistent loading far too often in non-Chrome browsers. Click on the graphs to go to the Google Insights detail pages for more interaction with the data.

Information security breaches have been the “new black” in the past eighteen months, with the latest fashion-trend being the LinkedIn passwords fiasco. This got me thinking: what is the “half-life” of a breach? It’s becoming obvious that users do not see the security of their information as a service differentiator or even a tier one decision point when choosing to use a new social network or online application. (How many of you closed out your LinkedIn accounts?) But, just how quickly does their attention wane from a breach event? Pretty quickly, if one formulates a conclusion based on Google Insights search data.

Let’s start with LinkedIn

We have a burst that – if one is generous – captures interest for about a week. Even more interesting is that it seems said interest was limited to very specific geographic regions:

Plus, the incident continues to help show the lack of impact breaches have on stock price:

But, LinkedIn is not exactly a broad-reaching service (i.e. it’s no Facebook).

Breaches Don’t Stop The Shopping

Investor exuberance notwithstanding, LinkedIn is kinda boring since folks use it to actually publish personal data to the world. While it has some private messaging and may hold some financial account information, it’s not like Zappos which has payment information and shopping history, and who was also breached this year. How long did they get attention?

While there is a longer, flat tail, attention is still about seven days (you can interact with the chart and zoom in to verify that claim) and Zappos’ overall consumer interest does not seem to have waned:

Sownage Revisited

The word “Sony” is now almost synonymous with “breach” in the minds of most information security folk. It’s our “go to” example when talking with executives and application teams. Unfortunately, for the purposes of comparative analysis, it wasn’t just one breach. So, while the chart shows closer to a ten week interest period, that makes sense when one considers there were over ten news stories (one for each new breach):

I won’t go into the details as to why including a stock price chart has little efficacy in determining breach effect for Sony (it’s been analyzed to death), but a comparative look at “PlayStation” (with an added factor for “iPad”) shows (to me) that the breaches had far less impact on interest in the PlayStation (one of the main breach targets) than the iPad had:

Breaches Spook The Spooks

So, if breaches are of little interest to the consumer, they must have greater impact on the community that has some skin in the game, right? Kinda. If we look at the RSA & Lockheed breaches:

We see that the Lockheed breach kept attention from mid-April to about mid-July (12 weeks) and RSA spiked twice for about four weeks each time. Both of them were intertwined in the news and RSA had numerous (to be blunt) PR-events that helped keep focus on both.

RSA is part of EMC, so a stock view analysis has many other complexities that make it less than ideal, but both companies (EMC & Lockheed) did not seem to suffer from the extended initial breach interest:

Only One View

I mentioned at the beginning of the post that this was intended to be a single-factor analysis, limited to what insights Google gleans from what folks are searching for. It doesn’t provide a view into enterprise contractual agreements, service usage patterns or even blogger/social media sentiment analysis. Yet, folks search for what they are interested in and when I add a few parameters to the LinkedIn chart:

we see that people are far more interested in Scarlett Johansson, gas prices and even Snookie than they are in LinkedIn insecurity. Perhaps breaches just aren’t sexy enough or personally impacting enough to truly matter…even to security professionals.

The Fund For Peace (FFP) and Foreign Policy jointly released the 2012 version of the “failed states index” (FSI). From the FFP site, the FSI:

…focuses on the indicators of risk and is based on thousands of articles and reports that are processed by our CAST Software from electronically available sources.

I read it every year (mostly due to being an ardent reader of Foreign Policy magazine) and find the rankings, methodology & insights quite intriguing. With my recent work on slopegraphs, I thought this would be a good data set to play with to determine what – if any – features were necessary to support rank order (and to provide some impetus to finally refactor the code to support multi-column slopegraphs…more on that later).

However, I was not looking forward to transcribing the data from the Flash visualization on the Foreign Policy web site. There are HTML grids on the FFP site but I really just wanted the overall rankings (i.e. no sub-indices) and noticed this interesting scrollable mini-grid on one of the FFP FSI pages:

Thankfully[?] it’s an IFRAME and I was able to pull 2010, 2011 & 2012 data in a very usable format by manipulating this URL: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/tables/fsiindex2010_sml.htm.

After some quick transformations, I had two CSV files for a 2010-2012 comparison and a 2011-2012 comparison.

(Before continuing, I feel the need to point out that the data, methodology, etc is 100% Copyright © 2012 The Fund for Peace as they overtly point out many times on their site.)

When I threw the data into the slopegraph tool, it was immediately obvious that I was missing something important: the ability to specify sort order for the data. For most slopegraphs, the code works well since our brains expect the larger values on the top. For a rank-order slopegraph, that sort order (for the most part) should be ascending vs descending to best represent changes in rank position. It does feel odd that being “#1” in the FSI actually means you’re really a loser, but I didn’t make the rules for their index.

So, PySlopegraph now handles two column rank order slopegraphs and, as you’ll see in part two, also handles multi-column slopegraphs (but that bit needs some work). The code will be up on github in a couple days as I’ve also got some half-finished support for Processing.js and Paper.js that I want to finish before another push. If anyone needs it sooner, just @ or DM me.

Now, For The Data

The “Top 25” (that sounds way too positive for what it really means) slopegraph is the easiest to read (as it’s the smallest). It is also where Foreign Policy & FFP focus some dataviz effort as well (though they do have visualizations for all the data). Here’s the slopegraph showing the rank order chance from 2010 to 2012:

The full slopegraphs are tall slopegraphs (I’ve been prototyping some ways to make tall ones more useful, but that’s nowhere near ready for public consumption). You may just want to grab the two PDFs and look there vs in this post:

Rank Order Comparison :: 2010/2012


Rank Order Comparison :: 2011/2012

While it requires scrolling, the changes in rank are immediately noticeable as is the fact that the the FFP folk allow for ties that leave “holes” in the table. I think you really get a feel for which countries are stable, improving and declining very quickly with the slopegraph version, but I’d like to hear your thoughts if you have an opine you’d like to share.

Stay tuned for part two!

If this feature was in Mountain Lion Developer Previews prior to revision 4, I didn’t notice it, but you can now tweet directly from the Notification Center “pane”.

You first need to make sure said feature is enabled in System Preferences (note the use of the “old” Notification Center icon in the preference pane icon set…perhaps Apple will change that prior to the final Mountain Lion build):

If it is enabled, you now have a Twitter – er – “button” [?] in the Notification Center pane, and clicking it gives you a tweet box where you can drop your 140 from all your connected Twitter accounts.

I suspect there will be similar Facebook posting features integrated, but I’m not part of the Facebook zombie horde and have no way of testing it.

I also noticed that Chrome now has tighter integration with the Notification Center than it did before (as in, I actually saw notifications pop up from Google Mail) and both the Beta channel and Canary builds have integrated the functionality: