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Category Archives: Information Security

insert(post, "{ 'standard_disclaimer' : 'My opinion, not my employer\'s' }")

This is a post about the fictional company FredCo. If the context or details presented by the post seem familiar, it’s purely coincidental. This is, again, a fictional story.

Let’s say FredCo had a pretty big breach that (fictionally) garnered media, Twitterverse, tech-world and Government-level attention and that we have some spurious details that let us sit back in our armchairs to opine about. What might have helped create the debacle at FredCo?

Despite (fictional) endless mainstream media coverage and a good chunk of ‘on background’ infosec-media clandestine blatherings we know very little about the breach itself (though it’s been fictionally, officially blamed on failure to patch Apache Struts). We know even less (fictionally officially) about the internal reach of the breach (apart from the limited consumer impact official disclosures). We know even less than that (fictionally officially) about how FredCo operates internally (process-wise).

But, I’ve (fictionally) seen:

  • a detailed breakdown of the number of domains, subdomains, and hosts FredCo “manages”.
  • the open port/service configurations of the public components of those domains
  • public information from individuals who are more willing to (fictionally) violate the CFAA than I am to get more than just port configuration information
  • a 2012/3 SAS 1 Type II report about FredCo controls
  • testimonies from FredCo execs regarding efficacy of $SECURITY_TECHOLOGY and 3 videos purporting to be indicative of expert opine on how to use BIIGG DATERZ to achieve cybersecurity success
  • the board & management structure + senior management bonus structures, complete with incentive-based objectives they were graded on

so, I’m going to blather a bit about how this fictional event should finally tear down the Potemkin village that is the combination of the Regulatory+Audit Industrial Complex and the Cybersecurity Industrial Complex.

“Tear down” with respect to the goal being to help individuals understand that a significant portion of organizations you entrust with your data are not incentivized or equipped to protect your data and that these same conditions exist in more critical areas — such as transportation, health care, and critical infrastructure — and you should expect a failure on the scale of FredCo — only with real, harmful impact — if nothing ends up changing soon.

From the top

There is boilerplate mention of “security” in the objectives of the senior executives between 2015 & 2016 14A filings:

  • CEO: “Employing advanced analytics and technology to help drive client growth, security, efficiency and profitability.”
  • CFO: “Continuing to advance and execute global enterprise risk management processes, including directing increased investment in data security, disaster recovery and regulatory compliance capabilities.”
  • CLO: “Continuing to refine and build out the Company’s global security organization.”
  • President, Workforce Solutions: None
  • CHRO: None
  • President – US Information Services: None

You’ll be happy to know that they all received either “Distinguished” or “Exceeds” on their appraisals and received a multiplier of their bonus & compensation targets as a result.

Furthermore, there is no one in the make-up of FredCo’s board of directors who has shown an interest or specialization in cybersecurity.

From the camera-positioned 50-yard line on instant replay, the board and shareholders of FredCo did not think protection of your identity and extremely personal information was important enough to include on three top executive directives and performance measure and was given little more than boilerplate mention for others. Investigators who look into FredCo’s breach should dig deep into the last decade of the detailed measures for these objectives. I have first-hand experience how these types of HR processes are managed in large orgs, which is why I’m encouraging this area for investigation.

“Security” is a terrible term, but it only works when it is an emergent property of the business processes of an organization. That means it must be contextual for every worker. Some colleagues suggest individual workers should not have to care about cybersecurity when making decisions or doing work, but even minimum-wage retail and grocery store clerks are educated about shoplifting risks and are given tools, tips and techniques to prevent loss. When your HR organizations is not incentivized to help create and maintain a cybersecurity-aware culture from the top you’re going to have problems, and when there are no cyberscurity-oriented targets for the CIO or even business process owners, don’t expect your holey screen door to keep out predators.

Awwwdit, Part I

NOTE: I’m not calling out any particular audit organization as I’ve only seen one fictional official report.

The Regulatory+Audit Industrial Complex is a lucrative business cabal. Governments and large business meta-agencies create structures where processes can be measured, verified and given a big green ✅. This validation exercise is generally done in one or more ways:

  • simple questionnaire, very high level questions, no veracity validation
  • more detailed questionnaire, mid-level questions, usually some in-person lightweight checking
  • detailed questionnaire, but with topics that can be sliced-and-diced by the legal+technical professions to mean literally anything, measured in-person by (usually) extremely junior reviewers with little-to-no domain expertise who follow review playbooks, get overwhelmed with log entries and scope-refinement+reduction and who end up being steered towards “important” but non-material findings

Sure, there are good audits and good auditors, but I will posit they are the rare diamonds in a bucket of zirconia.

We need to cover some technical ground before covering this further, though.

Shocking Struts

We’ll take the stated breach cause at face-value: failure to patch an remote-accessible vulnerability with Apache Struts. This was presented as the singular issue enabling attackers to walk (with crutches) away with scads of identify-theft-enabling personal data, administrator passwords, database passwords, and the recipe for the winning entry in the macaroni salad competition at last year’s HR annual picnic. Who knew one Java library had so much power!

We don’t know the architecture of all the web apps at FredCo. However, your security posture should not be a Jenga game tower, easily destroyed by removing one peg. These are all (generally) components of externally-facing applications at the scale of FredCo:

  • routers
  • switches
  • firewalls
  • load balancers
  • operating systems
  • application servers
  • middleware servers
  • database servers
  • customized code

These are mimicked (to varying levels of efficacy) across:

  • development
  • test
  • staging
  • production

environments.

They may coexist (in various layers of the network) with:

  • HR systems
  • Finance systems
  • Intranet servers
  • Active Directory
  • General user workstations
  • Executive workstations
  • Developer workstations
  • Mobile devices
  • Remote access infrastructure (i.e. VPNs)

A properly incentivized organization ensures there are logical and physical separation between/isolation of “stuff that matters” and that varying levels of authentication & authorization are applied to ensure access is restricted.

Keeping all that “secure” requires:

  • managing thousands of devices (servers, network components, laptops, desktops, mobile devices)
  • managing thousands of identities
  • managing thousands of configurations across systems, networks and devices
  • managing hundreds to thousands of connections between internal and external networks
  • managing thousands of rules
  • managing thousands of vulnerabilities (as they become known)
  • managing a secure development life cycle across hundreds or thousands of applications

Remember, though, that FredCo ostensibly managed all of that well and the data loss was solely due to one Java library.

If your executives (all of them) and workers (all of them) are not incentivized with that list in mind, you will have problems, but let’s talk about the security challenges back in the context of the audit role.

Awwwdit, Part II

The post is already long, so we’ll make this quick.

If I dropped you off — yes, you, because you’re likely as capable as the auditors mentioned in the previous section on audit — into that environment once a year, do you think you’d be able to ferret out issues based on convoluted network diagrams, poorly documented firewall rules and source code, non-standard checklists of user access management processes?

Let’s say I dropped you in months before the known Struts vulnerability and re-answer the question.

The burden placed on internal and — especially — external auditors is great and they are pretty much set up for failure from engagement number one.

Couple IT complexity with the fact that many orgs like FredCo aren’t required to do more than ensure financial reporting processes are ?.

But, even if there were more technical, security-oriented audits performed, you’d likely have ten different report findings by as many firms or auditors, especially if they were point-in-time audits. Furthermore, FredCo has has decades of point-in-time audits but hundreds of auditors and dozens of firms. The conditions of the breach were likely not net-new, so how did decades of systemic IT failures go unnoticed by this cabal?

IT audit functions are a multi-billion dollar business. FredCo is partially the result of the built-in cracks in the way verification is performed in orgs. In other words, I posit the Regulatory+Audit Industrial Complex bears some of the responsibility for FredCo’s breach.

Divisive Devices

From the (now removed) testimonials & videos, it was clear there may have been a “blinky light” problem in the mindset of those responsible for cybersecurity at FredCo. Relying solely on the capabilities of one or more devices (they are usually appliances with blinky lights) and thinking that storing petabytes of log data are going to stop “bad guys’ is a great recipe for a breach parfait.

But, the Cybersecurity Industrial Complex continues to dole out LED-laden boxes with the fervor of a U.S. doctor handing out opioids. Sure, they are just giving orgs what they want, but it doesn’t make it responsible behaviour. Just like the opioid problem, the “device” issue is likely causing cyber-sickness in more organizations that you’d like to admit. You may even know someone who works at an org with a box-addition.

I posit the Cybersecurity Industrial Complex bears some of the responsibility for FredCo’s breach, especially when you consider the hundreds of marketing e-mails I’ve seen post-FredCo breach telling me how CyberBox XJ9-11 would have stopped FredCo’s attackers cold.

A Matter of Trust

If removing a Struts peg from FredCo’s IT Jenga board caused the fictional tower to crash:

  • What do you think the B2B infrastructure looks like?
  • How do you think endpoints are managed?
  • What isolation, segmentation and access controls really exist?
  • How effective do you think their security awareness program is?
  • How many apps are architected & managed as poorly as the breached one?
  • How many shadow IT deployments exist in the ☁️ with your data in it?
  • How can you trust FredCo with anything of importance?

Fictional FIN

In this fictional world I’ve created one ending is:

  • all B2B connections to FredCo have been severed
  • lawyers at a thousand firms are working on language for filings to cancel all B2B contracts with FredCo
  • FredCo was de-listed from exchanges
  • FredCo executives are defending against a slew of criminal and civil charges
  • The U.S. Congress and U.K. Parliament have come together to undertake a joint review of regulatory and audit practices spanning both countries (since it impacted both countries and the Reg+Audit cabal spans both countries they decided to save time and money) resulting in sweeping changes
  • The SEC has mandated detailed cybersecurity objectives be placed on all senior management executives at all public companies and have forced results of those objectives assessments to be part of a new filing requirement.
  • The SEC has also mandated that at least one voting board member of public companies must have demonstrated experience with cybersecurity
  • The FTC creates and enforces standards on cybersecurity product advertising practices
  • You have understood that nobody has your back when it comes to managing your sensitive, personal data and that you must become an active participant in helping to ensure your elected representatives hold all organizations accountable when it comes to taking their responsibilities seriously.

but, another is:

  • FredCo’s stock bounces back
  • FredCo loses no business partners
  • FredCo’s current & former execs faced no civil or criminal charges
  • Congress makes a bit of opportunistic, temporary bluster for the sake of 2018 elections but doesn’t do anything more than berate FredCo publicly
  • You’re so tired of all these breaches and data loss that you go back to playing “Clash of Clans” on your mobile phone and do nothing.

I caught a mention of this project by Pete Warden on Four Short Links today. If his name sounds familiar, he’s the creator of the DSTK, an O’Reilly author, and now works at Google. A decidedly clever and decent chap.

The project goal is noble: crowdsource and make a repository of open speech data for researchers to make a better world. Said sourcing is done by asking folks to record themselves saying “Yes”, “No” and other short words.

As I meandered over the blog post I looked in horror on the URL for the application that did the recording: https://open-speech-commands.appspot.com/.

Why would the goal of the project combined with that URL give pause? Read on!

You’ve Got Scams!

Picking up the phone and saying something as simple as ‘Yes’ has been a major scam this year. By recording your voice, attackers can replay it on phone prompts and because it’s your voice it makes it harder to refute the evidence and can foil recognition systems that look for your actual voice.

As the chart above shows, the Better Business Bureau has logged over 5,000 of these scams this year (searching for ‘phishing’ and ‘yes’). You can play with the data (a bit — the package needs work) in R with scamtracker.

Now, these are “analog” attacks (i.e. a human spends time socially engineering a human). Bookmark this as you peruse section 2.

Integrity Challenges in 2017

I “trust” Pete’s intentions, but I sure don’t trust open-speech-commands.appspot.com (and, you shouldn’t either). Why? Go visit https://totally-harmless-app.appspot.com. It’s a Google App Engine app I made for this post. Anyone can make an appspot app and the https is meaningless as far as integrity & authenticity goes since I’m running on google’s infrastructure but I’m not google.

You can’t really trust most SSL/TLS sessions as far as site integrity goes anyway. Let’s Encrypt put the final nail in the coffin with their Certs Gone Wild! initiative. With super-recent browser updates you can almost trust your eyes again when it comes to URLs, but you should be very wary of entering your info — especially uploading voice, prints or eye/face images — into any input box on any site if you aren’t 100% sure it’s a legit site that you trust.

Tracking the Trackers

If you don’t know that you’re being tracked 100% of the time on the internet then you really need to read up on the modern internet.

In many cases your IP address can directly identify you. In most cases your device & browser profile — which most commercial sites log — can directly identify you. So, just visiting a web site means that it’s highly likely that web site can know that you are both not a dog and are in fact you.

Still Waiting for the “So, What?”

Many states and municipalities have engaged in awareness campaigns to warn citizens about the “Say ‘Yes'” scam. Asking someone to record themselves saying ‘Yes’ into a random web site pretty much negates that advice.

Folks like me regularly warn about trust on the internet. I could have cloned the functionality of the original site to open-speech-commmands.appspot.com. Did you even catch the 3rd ‘m’ there? Even without that, it’s an appspot.com domain. Anyone can set one up.

Even if the site doesn’t ask for your name or other info and just asks for your ‘Yes’, it can know who you are. In fact, when you’re enabling the microphone to do the recording, it could even take a picture of you if it wanted to (and you’d likely not know or not object since it’s for SCIENCE!).

So, in the worst case scenario a malicious entity could be asking you for your ‘Yes’, tying it right to you and then executing the post-scam attacks that were being performed in the analog version.

But, go so far as to assume this is a legit site with good intentions. Do you really know what’s being logged when you commit your voice info? If the data was mishandled, it would be just as easy to tie the voice files back to you (assuming a certain level of data logging).

The “so what” is not really a warning to users but a message to researchers: You need to threat model your experiments and research initiatives, especially when innocent end users are potentially being put at risk. Data is the new gold, diamonds and other precious bits that attackers are after. You may think you’re not putting folks at risk and aren’t even a hacker target, but how you design data gathering can reinforce good or bad behaviour on the part of users. It can solidify solid security messages or tear them down. And, you and your data may be more of a target than you really know.

Reach out to interdisciplinary colleagues to help threat model your data collection, storage and dissemination methods to ensure you aren’t putting yourself or others at risk.

FIN

Pete did the right thing:

and, I’m sure the site will be on a “proper” domain soon. When it is, I’ll be one of the first in line to help make a much-needed open data set for research purposes.

Tagging this as #rstats-related since many R coders use Travis-CI to automate package builds (and other things). Security researcher Ivan Vyshnevskyi did some ++gd responsible disclosure to the Travis-CI folks letting them know they were leaking the contents of “secure” environment variables in the build logs.

The TL;DR on “secure” environment variables is that they let you store secrets — such as OAuth keys or API tokens — ostensibly “securely” (they have to be decrypted to be used so someone/something has they keys to do that so it’s not really “secure”). That is, they should not leak them in build logs. Except that they did…for a bit.

As mentioned, this flaw was reported and is now fixed. Regen your “secrets” and keep an eye on Travis security announcements moving forward.

It’s no seekrit that I :heart: Hilbert curve heatmaps of IPv4 space. Real-world IPv4 maps (i.e. the ones that drop dots on the Earth) have little utility, but with Hilbert curves maps of IPv4 space many different topologies can be superimposed (from ASNs to—if need be—geographic locations). Plus, there’s more opportunity to find patterns by keeping CIDRs naturally close to each other.

The Measurement Factory created the [`ipv4-heatmap`](http://maps.measurement-factory.com/) command-line utility back in 2007 and there have been some tweaks and expansions to it by others over time. I wanted to use these IPv4 heatmaps in the [National Exposure](https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2016/06/07/rapid7-releases-new-research) report I worked on with @todb & @jhartftw at @Rapid7 but _cannot stand_ the built-in red-blue color scheme, especially when there’s [viridis](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/viridis/vignettes/intro-to-viridis.html) available. So, I [forked the code](https://github.com/hrbrmstr/ipv4-heatmap) and added both viridis and [colorbrewer](colorbrewer2.org) palettes to it as command-line options.

Here are two examples (the results of the National Exposure study), one using viridis and one using the colorbrewer `rdbu` palette:

![](https://www.dropbox.com/s/we5f5u7ejj7cp8l/viridis.png?raw=1)

![](https://www.dropbox.com/s/uznijxxq99qoces/rdbu-inverted.png?raw=1)

You specify the palette with `-P palette` and can invert the order of any palette with `-i` and the chosen palette will also be used in any legend you add the visualization.

Since these 4096×4096 files are a bit big, you can hit up [this dropbox link](https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wqyly8ewxeko5jn/AAC5bHIpQTuxWGBPYzMqceLQa?dl=0) to see a “gallery” of the various forward and reverse palettes.

The palette selection code is a bit brute-force at the moment, mostly due to the fact that I’m planning on a C++ port of the code and eventual inclusion of the Hilbert heatmap functionality in the [`iptools`](http://github.com/hrbrmstr/iptools) package.

Google recently [announced](https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/dns-over-https) their DNS-over-HTTPS API, which _”enhances privacy and security between a client and a recursive resolver, and complements DNSSEC to provide end-to-end authenticated DNS lookups”_. The REST API they provided was pretty simple to [wrap into a package](https://github.com/hrbrmstr/gdns) and I tossed in some [SPF](http://www.openspf.org/SPF_Record_Syntax) functions that I had lying around to bulk it up a bit.

### Why DNS-over-HTTPS?

DNS machinations usually happen over UDP (and sometimes TCP). Unless you’re using some fairly modern DNS augmentations, these exchanges happen in cleartext, meaning your query and the response are exposed during transport (and they are already exposed to the server you’re querying for a response).

DNS queries over HTTPS will be harder to [spoof](http://www.veracode.com/security/spoofing-attack) and the query + response will be encrypted, so you gain transport privacy when, say, you’re at Starbucks or from your DSL, FiOS, Gogo Inflight, or cable internet provider (yes, they all snoop on your DNS queries).

You end up trusting Google quite a bit with this API, but if you were currently using `8.8.8.8` or `8.8.4.4` (or their IPv6 equivalents) you were already trusting Google (and it’s likely Google knows what you’re doing on the internet anyway given all the trackers and especially if you’re using Chrome).

One additional item you gain using this API is more control over [`EDNS0`](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vandergaast-edns-client-ip-00) settings. `EDNS0` is a DNS protocol extension that, for example, enables the content delivery networks to pick the “closest” server farm to ensure speedy delivery of your streaming Game of Thrones binge watch. They get to know a piece of your IP address so they can make this decision, but you end up giving away a bit of privacy (though you lose the privacy in the end since the target CDN servers know precisely where you are).

Right now, there’s no way for most clients to use DNS-over-HTTPS directly, but the API can be used in a programmatic fashion, which may be helpful in situations where you need to do some DNS spelunking but UDP is blocked or you’re on a platform that can’t build the [`resolv`](https://github.com/hrbrmstr/resolv) package.

You can learn a bit more about DNS and privacy in this [IETF paper](https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dns-privacy/current/pdfWqAIUmEl47.pdf) [PDF].

### Mining DNS with `gdns`

The `gdns` package is pretty straightforward. Use the `query()` function to get DNS info for a single entity:

library(gdns)
 
query("apple.com")
## $Status  
## [1] 0          # NOERROR - Standard DNS response code (32 bit integer)
## 
## $TC
## [1] FALSE      # Whether the response is truncated
## 
## $RD
## [1] TRUE       # Should always be true for Google Public DNS
## 
## $RA
## [1] TRUE       # Should always be true for Google Public DNS
## 
## $AD
## [1] FALSE      # Whether all response data was validated with DNSSEC
## 
## $CD
## [1] FALSE      # Whether the client asked to disable DNSSEC
## 
## $Question
##         name type
## 1 apple.com.    1
## 
## $Answer
##         name type  TTL          data
## 1 apple.com.    1 1547 17.172.224.47
## 2 apple.com.    1 1547  17.178.96.59
## 3 apple.com.    1 1547 17.142.160.59
## 
## $Additional
## list()
## 
## $edns_client_subnet
## [1] "0.0.0.0/0"

The `gdns` lookup functions are set to use an `edns_client_subnet` of `0.0.0.0/0`, meaning your local IP address or subnet is not leaked outside of your connection to Google (you can override this behavior).

You can do reverse lookups as well (i.e. query IP addresses):

query("17.172.224.47", "PTR")
## $Status
## [1] 0
## 
## $TC
## [1] FALSE
## 
## $RD
## [1] TRUE
## 
## $RA
## [1] TRUE
## 
## $AD
## [1] FALSE
## 
## $CD
## [1] FALSE
## 
## $Question
##                          name type
## 1 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12
## 
## $Answer
##                            name type  TTL                           data
## 1   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               webobjects.info.
## 2   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   yessql.info.
## 3   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 apples-msk.ru.
## 4   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     icloud.se.
## 5   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     icloud.es.
## 6   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     icloud.om.
## 7   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   icloudo.com.
## 8   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     icloud.ch.
## 9   47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     icloud.fr.
## 10  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   icloude.com.
## 11  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073          camelspaceeffect.com.
## 12  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 camelphat.com.
## 13  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              alchemysynth.com.
## 14  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                    openni.org.
## 15  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                      swell.am.
## 16  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  appleweb.net.
## 17  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073       appleipodsettlement.com.
## 18  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                    earpod.net.
## 19  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 yourapple.com.
## 20  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                    xserve.net.
## 21  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                    xserve.com.
## 22  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            velocityengine.com.
## 23  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073           velocity-engine.com.
## 24  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            universityarts.com.
## 25  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            thinkdifferent.com.
## 26  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               theatremode.com.
## 27  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               theatermode.com.
## 28  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073           streamquicktime.net.
## 29  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073           streamquicktime.com.
## 30  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                ripmixburn.com.
## 31  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              rip-mix-burn.com.
## 32  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        quicktimestreaming.net.
## 33  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        quicktimestreaming.com.
## 34  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  quicktime.cc.
## 35  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                      qttv.net.
## 36  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                      qtml.com.
## 37  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     qt-tv.net.
## 38  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073          publishingsurvey.org.
## 39  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073          publishingsurvey.com.
## 40  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        publishingresearch.org.
## 41  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        publishingresearch.com.
## 42  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073         publishing-survey.org.
## 43  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073         publishing-survey.com.
## 44  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073       publishing-research.org.
## 45  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073       publishing-research.com.
## 46  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  powerbook.cc.
## 47  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             playquicktime.net.
## 48  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             playquicktime.com.
## 49  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073           nwk-apple.apple.com.
## 50  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   myapple.net.
## 51  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  macreach.net.
## 52  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  macreach.com.
## 53  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   macmate.com.
## 54  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073         macintoshsoftware.com.
## 55  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                    machos.net.
## 56  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   mach-os.net.
## 57  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   mach-os.com.
## 58  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   ischool.com.
## 59  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073           insidemacintosh.com.
## 60  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             imovietheater.com.
## 61  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               imoviestage.com.
## 62  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             imoviegallery.com.
## 63  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               imacsources.com.
## 64  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        imac-applecomputer.com.
## 65  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                imac-apple.com.
## 66  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     ikids.com.
## 67  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              ibookpartner.com.
## 68  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   geoport.com.
## 69  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   firewire.cl.
## 70  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               expertapple.com.
## 71  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              edu-research.org.
## 72  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               dvdstudiopro.us.
## 73  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              dvdstudiopro.org.
## 74  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              dvdstudiopro.net.
## 75  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             dvdstudiopro.info.
## 76  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              dvdstudiopro.com.
## 77  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              dvdstudiopro.biz.
## 78  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073          developercentral.com.
## 79  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             desktopmovies.org.
## 80  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             desktopmovies.net.
## 81  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              desktopmovie.org.
## 82  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              desktopmovie.net.
## 83  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              desktopmovie.com.
## 84  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073          darwinsourcecode.com.
## 85  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              darwinsource.org.
## 86  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              darwinsource.com.
## 87  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                darwincode.com.
## 88  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                carbontest.com.
## 89  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              carbondating.com.
## 90  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 carbonapi.com.
## 91  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073           braeburncapital.com.
## 92  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  applexpo.net.
## 93  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  applexpo.com.
## 94  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                applereach.net.
## 95  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                applereach.com.
## 96  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            appleiservices.com.
## 97  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073     applefinalcutproworld.org.
## 98  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073     applefinalcutproworld.net.
## 99  47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073     applefinalcutproworld.com.
## 100 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            applefilmmaker.com.
## 101 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             applefilmaker.com.
## 102 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                appleenews.com.
## 103 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               appledarwin.org.
## 104 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               appledarwin.net.
## 105 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               appledarwin.com.
## 106 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073         applecomputerimac.com.
## 107 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        applecomputer-imac.com.
## 108 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  applecare.cc.
## 109 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               applecarbon.com.
## 110 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 apple-inc.net.
## 111 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               apple-enews.com.
## 112 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              apple-darwin.org.
## 113 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              apple-darwin.net.
## 114 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              apple-darwin.com.
## 115 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                  mobileme.com.
## 116 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                ipa-iphone.net.
## 117 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               jetfuelapps.com.
## 118 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                jetfuelapp.com.
## 119 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   burstly.net.
## 120 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             appmediagroup.com.
## 121 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             airsupportapp.com.
## 122 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            burstlyrewards.com.
## 123 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073        surveys-temp.apple.com.
## 124 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               appleiphone.com.
## 125 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                       asto.re.
## 126 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 itunesops.com.
## 127 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     apple.com.
## 128 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073     st11p01ww-apple.apple.com.
## 129 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                      apple.by.
## 130 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 airtunes.info.
## 131 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              applecentre.info.
## 132 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073         applecomputerinc.info.
## 133 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                appleexpo.info.
## 134 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073             applemasters.info.
## 135 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 applepay.info.
## 136 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073 applepaymerchantsupplies.info.
## 137 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073         applepaysupplies.info.
## 138 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              applescript.info.
## 139 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073               appleshare.info.
## 140 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                   macosx.info.
## 141 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                powerbook.info.
## 142 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 powermac.info.
## 143 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            quicktimelive.info.
## 144 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073              quicktimetv.info.
## 145 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 sherlock.info.
## 146 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073            shopdifferent.info.
## 147 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                 skyvines.info.
## 148 47.224.172.17.in-addr.arpa.   12 1073                     ubnw.info.
## 
## $Additional
## list()
## 
## $edns_client_subnet
## [1] "0.0.0.0/0"

And, you can go “easter egg” hunting:

cat(query("google-public-dns-a.google.com", "TXT")$Answer$data)
## "http://xkcd.com/1361/"

Note that Google DNS-over-HTTPS supports [all the RR types](http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-4).

If you have more than a few domains to lookup and are querying for the same RR record, you can use the `bulk_query()` function:

hosts <- c("rud.is", "dds.ec", "r-project.org", "rstudio.com", "apple.com")
bulk_query(hosts)
## Source: local data frame [7 x 4]
## 
##             name  type   TTL            data
##            (chr) (int) (int)           (chr)
## 1        rud.is.     1  3599 104.236.112.222
## 2        dds.ec.     1   299   162.243.111.4
## 3 r-project.org.     1  3601   137.208.57.37
## 4   rstudio.com.     1  3599    45.79.156.36
## 5     apple.com.     1  1088   17.172.224.47
## 6     apple.com.     1  1088    17.178.96.59
## 7     apple.com.     1  1088   17.142.160.59

Note that this function only returns a `data_frame` (none of the status fields).

### More DNSpelunking with `gdns`

DNS records contain a treasure trove of data (at least for cybersecurity researchers). Say you have a list of base, primary domains for the Fortune 1000:

library(readr)
library(urltools)
 
URL <- "https://gist.githubusercontent.com/hrbrmstr/ae574201af3de035c684/raw/2d21bb4132b77b38f2992dfaab99649397f238e9/f1000.csv"
fil <- basename(URL)
if (!file.exists(fil)) download.file(URL, fil)
 
f1k <- read_csv(fil)
 
doms1k <- suffix_extract(domain(f1k$website))
doms1k <- paste(doms1k$domain, doms1k$suffix, sep=".")
 
head(doms1k)
## [1] "walmart.com"           "exxonmobil.com"       
## [3] "chevron.com"           "berkshirehathaway.com"
## [5] "apple.com"             "gm.com"

We can get all the `TXT` records for them:

library(parallel)
library(doParallel) # parallel ops will make this go faster
library(foreach)
library(dplyr)
library(ggplot2)
library(grid)
library(hrbrmrkdn)
 
cl <- makePSOCKcluster(4)
registerDoParallel(cl)
 
f1k_l <- foreach(dom=doms1k) %dopar% gdns::bulk_query(dom, "TXT")
f1k <- bind_rows(f1k_l)
 
length(unique(f1k$name))
## [1] 858
 
df <- count(count(f1k, name), `Number of TXT records`=n)
df <- bind_rows(df, data_frame(`Number of TXT records`=0, n=142))
 
gg <- ggplot(df, aes(`Number of TXT records`, n))
gg <- gg + geom_bar(stat="identity", width=0.75)
gg <- gg + scale_x_continuous(expand=c(0,0), breaks=0:13)
gg <- gg + scale_y_continuous(expand=c(0,0))
gg <- gg + labs(y="# Orgs", 
                title="TXT record count per Fortune 1000 Org")
gg <- gg + theme_hrbrmstr(grid="Y", axis="xy")
gg <- gg + theme(axis.title.x=element_text(margin=margin(t=-22)))
gg <- gg + theme(axis.title.y=element_text(angle=0, vjust=1, 
                                           margin=margin(r=-49)))
gg <- gg + theme(plot.margin=margin(t=10, l=30, b=30, r=10))
gg <- gg + theme(plot.title=element_text(margin=margin(b=20)))
gg

Fullscreen_4_11_16__12_35_AM

We can see that 858 of the Fortune 1000 have `TXT` records and more than a few have between 2 and 5 of them. Why look at `TXT` records? Well, they can tell us things like who uses cloud e-mail services, such as Outlook365:

sort(f1k$name[which(grepl("(MS=|outlook)", spf_includes(f1k$data), ignore.case=TRUE))])
##   [1] "21cf.com."                  "77nrg.com."                 "abbott.com."                "acuitybrands.com."         
##   [5] "adm.com."                   "adobe.com."                 "alaskaair.com."             "aleris.com."               
##   [9] "allergan.com."              "altria.com."                "amark.com."                 "ameren.com."               
##  [13] "americantower.com."         "ametek.com."                "amkor.com."                 "amphenol.com."             
##  [17] "amwater.com."               "analog.com."                "anixter.com."               "apachecorp.com."           
##  [21] "archrock.com."              "archrock.com."              "armstrong.com."             "aschulman.com."            
##  [25] "assurant.com."              "autonation.com."            "autozone.com."              "axiall.com."               
##  [29] "bd.com."                    "belk.com."                  "biglots.com."               "bio-rad.com."              
##  [33] "biomet.com."                "bloominbrands.com."         "bms.com."                   "borgwarner.com."           
##  [37] "boydgaming.com."            "brinks.com."                "brocade.com."               "brunswick.com."            
##  [41] "cabotog.com."               "caleres.com."               "campbellsoupcompany.com."   "carefusion.com."           
##  [45] "carlyle.com."               "cartech.com."               "cbrands.com."               "cbre.com."                 
##  [49] "chemtura.com."              "chipotle.com."              "chiquita.com."              "churchdwight.com."         
##  [53] "cinemark.com."              "cintas.com."                "cmc.com."                   "cmsenergy.com."            
##  [57] "cognizant.com."             "colfaxcorp.com."            "columbia.com."              "commscope.com."            
##  [61] "con-way.com."               "convergys.com."             "couche-tard.com."           "crestwoodlp.com."          
##  [65] "crowncastle.com."           "crowncork.com."             "csx.com."                   "cummins.com."              
##  [69] "cunamutual.com."            "dana.com."                  "darlingii.com."             "deanfoods.com."            
##  [73] "dentsplysirona.com."        "discoverfinancial.com."     "disney.com."                "donaldson.com."            
##  [77] "drhorton.com."              "dupont.com."                "dyn-intl.com."              "dynegy.com."               
##  [81] "ea.com."                    "eastman.com."               "ecolab.com."                "edgewell.com."             
##  [85] "edwards.com."               "emc.com."                   "enablemidstream.com."       "energyfutureholdings.com." 
##  [89] "energytransfer.com."        "eogresources.com."          "equinix.com."               "expeditors.com."           
##  [93] "express.com."               "fastenal.com."              "ferrellgas.com."            "fisglobal.com."            
##  [97] "flowserve.com."             "fmglobal.com."              "fnf.com."                   "g-iii.com."                
## [101] "genpt.com."                 "ggp.com."                   "gilead.com."                "goodyear.com."             
## [105] "grainger.com."              "graphicpkg.com."            "hanes.com."                 "hanover.com."              
## [109] "harley-davidson.com."       "harsco.com."                "hasbro.com."                "hbfuller.com."             
## [113] "hei.com."                   "hhgregg.com."               "hnicorp.com."               "homedepot.com."            
## [117] "hpinc.com."                 "hubgroup.com."              "iac.com."                   "igt.com."                  
## [121] "iheartmedia.com."           "insperity.com."             "itt.com."                   "itw.com."                  
## [125] "jarden.com."                "jcpenney.com."              "jll.com."                   "joyglobal.com."            
## [129] "juniper.net."               "kellyservices.com."         "kennametal.com."            "kiewit.com."               
## [133] "kindermorgan.com."          "kindredhealthcare.com."     "kodak.com."                 "lamresearch.com."          
## [137] "lansingtradegroup.com."     "lennar.com."                "levistrauss.com."           "lithia.com."               
## [141] "manitowoc.com."             "manpowergroup.com."         "marathonoil.com."           "marathonpetroleum.com."    
## [145] "mastec.com."                "mastercard.com."            "mattel.com."                "maximintegrated.com."      
## [149] "mednax.com."                "mercuryinsurance.com."      "mgmresorts.com."            "micron.com."               
## [153] "mohawkind.com."             "molsoncoors.com."           "mosaicco.com."              "motorolasolutions.com."    
## [157] "mpgdriven.com."             "mscdirect.com."             "mtb.com."                   "murphyoilcorp.com."        
## [161] "mutualofomaha.com."         "mwv.com."                   "navistar.com."              "nbty.com."                 
## [165] "newellrubbermaid.com."      "nexeosolutions.com."        "nike.com."                  "nobleenergyinc.com."       
## [169] "o-i.com."                   "oge.com."                   "olin.com."                  "omnicomgroup.com."         
## [173] "onsemi.com."                "owens-minor.com."           "paychex.com."               "peabodyenergy.com."        
## [177] "pepboys.com."               "pmi.com."                   "pnkinc.com."                "polaris.com."              
## [181] "polyone.com."               "postholdings.com."          "ppg.com."                   "prudential.com."           
## [185] "qg.com."                    "quantaservices.com."        "quintiles.com."             "rcscapital.com."           
## [189] "rexnord.com."               "roberthalf.com."            "rushenterprises.com."       "ryland.com."               
## [193] "sandisk.com."               "sands.com."                 "scansource.com."            "sempra.com."               
## [197] "sonoco.com."                "spiritaero.com."            "sprouts.com."               "stanleyblackanddecker.com."
## [201] "starwoodhotels.com."        "steelcase.com."             "stryker.com."               "sunedison.com."            
## [205] "sunpower.com."              "supervalu.com."             "swifttrans.com."            "synnex.com."               
## [209] "taylormorrison.com."        "techdata.com."              "tegna.com."                 "tempursealy.com."          
## [213] "tetratech.com."             "theice.com."                "thermofisher.com."          "tjx.com."                  
## [217] "trueblue.com."              "ufpi.com."                  "ulta.com."                  "unfi.com."                 
## [221] "unifiedgrocers.com."        "universalcorp.com."         "vishay.com."                "visteon.com."              
## [225] "vwr.com."                   "westarenergy.com."          "westernunion.com."          "westrock.com."             
## [229] "wfscorp.com."               "whitewave.com."             "wpxenergy.com."             "wyndhamworldwide.com."     
## [233] "xilinx.com."                "xpo.com."                   "yum.com."                   "zimmerbiomet.com."

That’s 236 of them outsourcing some part of e-mail services to Microsoft.

We can also see which ones have terrible mail configs (`+all` or `all` passing):

f1k[which(passes_all(f1k$data)),]$name
## [1] "wfscorp.com."      "dupont.com."       "group1auto.com."   "uhsinc.com."      
## [5] "bigheartpet.com."  "pcconnection.com."

or are configured for Exchange federation services:

sort(f1k$name[which(grepl("==", f1k$data))])
## sort(f1k$name[which(grepl("==", f1k$data))])
##   [1] "21cf.com."                 "aarons.com."               "abbott.com."               "abbvie.com."              
##   [5] "actavis.com."              "activisionblizzard.com."   "acuitybrands.com."         "adm.com."                 
##   [9] "adobe.com."                "adt.com."                  "advanceautoparts.com."     "aecom.com."               
##  [13] "aetna.com."                "agilent.com."              "airproducts.com."          "alcoa.com."               
##  [17] "aleris.com."               "allergan.com."             "alliancedata.com."         "amcnetworks.com."         
##  [21] "amd.com."                  "americantower.com."        "amfam.com."                "amgen.com."               
##  [25] "amtrustgroup.com."         "amtrustgroup.com."         "amtrustgroup.com."         "amtrustgroup.com."        
##  [29] "anadarko.com."             "analog.com."               "apachecorp.com."           "applied.com."             
##  [33] "aptar.com."                "aramark.com."              "aramark.com."              "arcb.com."                
##  [37] "archcoal.com."             "armstrong.com."            "armstrong.com."            "arrow.com."               
##  [41] "asburyauto.com."           "autonation.com."           "avnet.com."                "ball.com."                
##  [45] "bankofamerica.com."        "baxter.com."               "bc.com."                   "bd.com."                  
##  [49] "bd.com."                   "bd.com."                   "belden.com."               "bemis.com."               
##  [53] "bestbuy.com."              "biogen.com."               "biomet.com."               "bloominbrands.com."       
##  [57] "bms.com."                  "boeing.com."               "bonton.com."               "borgwarner.com."          
##  [61] "brinks.com."               "brocade.com."              "brunswick.com."            "c-a-m.com."               
##  [65] "ca.com."                   "cabelas.com."              "cabotog.com."              "caleres.com."             
##  [69] "caleres.com."              "caleres.com."              "calpine.com."              "capitalone.com."          
##  [73] "cardinal.com."             "carlyle.com."              "carlyle.com."              "cartech.com."             
##  [77] "cbre.com."                 "celgene.com."              "centene.com."              "centurylink.com."         
##  [81] "cerner.com."               "cerner.com."               "cfindustries.com."         "ch2m.com."                
##  [85] "chevron.com."              "chipotle.com."             "chiquita.com."             "chk.com."                 
##  [89] "chrobinson.com."           "chs.net."                  "chsinc.com."               "chubb.com."               
##  [93] "ciena.com."                "cigna.com."                "cinemark.com."             "cit.com."                 
##  [97] "cmc.com."                  "cmegroup.com."             "coach.com."                "cognizant.com."           
## [101] "cokecce.com."              "colfaxcorp.com."           "columbia.com."             "commscope.com."           
## [105] "con-way.com."              "conagrafoods.com."         "conocophillips.com."       "coopertire.com."          
## [109] "core-mark.com."            "crbard.com."               "crestwoodlp.com."          "crowncastle.com."         
## [113] "crowncork.com."            "csx.com."                  "danaher.com."              "darden.com."              
## [117] "darlingii.com."            "davita.com."               "davita.com."               "davita.com."              
## [121] "dentsplysirona.com."       "diebold.com."              "diplomat.is."              "dish.com."                
## [125] "disney.com."               "donaldson.com."            "dresser-rand.com."         "dstsystems.com."          
## [129] "dupont.com."               "dupont.com."               "dyn-intl.com."             "dyn-intl.com."            
## [133] "dynegy.com."               "ea.com."                   "ea.com."                   "eastman.com."             
## [137] "ebay.com."                 "echostar.com."             "ecolab.com."               "edmc.edu."                
## [141] "edwards.com."              "elcompanies.com."          "emc.com."                  "emerson.com."             
## [145] "energyfutureholdings.com." "energytransfer.com."       "eogresources.com."         "equinix.com."             
## [149] "essendant.com."            "esterline.com."            "evhc.net."                 "exelisinc.com."           
## [153] "exeloncorp.com."           "express-scripts.com."      "express.com."              "express.com."             
## [157] "exxonmobil.com."           "familydollar.com."         "fanniemae.com."            "fastenal.com."            
## [161] "fbhs.com."                 "ferrellgas.com."           "firstenergycorp.com."      "firstsolar.com."          
## [165] "fiserv.com."               "flowserve.com."            "fmc.com."                  "fmglobal.com."            
## [169] "fnf.com."                  "freddiemac.com."           "ge.com."                   "genpt.com."               
## [173] "genworth.com."             "ggp.com."                  "grace.com."                "grainger.com."            
## [177] "graphicpkg.com."           "graybar.com."              "guess.com."                "hain.com."                
## [181] "halliburton.com."          "hanes.com."                "hanes.com."                "harley-davidson.com."     
## [185] "harman.com."               "harris.com."               "harsco.com."               "hasbro.com."              
## [189] "hcahealthcare.com."        "hcc.com."                  "hei.com."                  "henryschein.com."         
## [193] "hess.com."                 "hhgregg.com."              "hnicorp.com."              "hollyfrontier.com."       
## [197] "hologic.com."              "honeywell.com."            "hospira.com."              "hp.com."                  
## [201] "hpinc.com."                "hrblock.com."              "iac.com."                  "igt.com."                 
## [205] "iheartmedia.com."          "imshealth.com."            "ingrammicro.com."          "intel.com."               
## [209] "interpublic.com."          "intuit.com."               "ironmountain.com."         "jacobs.com."              
## [213] "jarden.com."               "jcpenney.com."             "jll.com."                  "johndeere.com."           
## [217] "johndeere.com."            "joyglobal.com."            "juniper.net."              "karauctionservices.com."  
## [221] "kbhome.com."               "kemper.com."               "keurig.com."               "khov.com."                
## [225] "kindredhealthcare.com."    "kkr.com."                  "kla-tencor.com."           "labcorp.com."             
## [229] "labcorp.com."              "lamresearch.com."          "lamresearch.com."          "landolakesinc.com."       
## [233] "lansingtradegroup.com."    "lear.com."                 "leggmason.com."            "leidos.com."              
## [237] "level3.com."               "libertymutual.com."        "lilly.com."                "lithia.com."              
## [241] "livenation.com."           "lkqcorp.com."              "loews.com."                "magellanhealth.com."      
## [245] "manitowoc.com."            "marathonoil.com."          "marathonpetroleum.com."    "markelcorp.com."          
## [249] "markwest.com."             "marriott.com."             "martinmarietta.com."       "masco.com."               
## [253] "massmutual.com."           "mastec.com."               "mastercard.com."           "mattel.com."              
## [257] "maximintegrated.com."      "mckesson.com."             "mercuryinsurance.com."     "meritor.com."             
## [261] "metlife.com."              "mgmresorts.com."           "micron.com."               "microsoft.com."           
## [265] "mohawkind.com."            "molsoncoors.com."          "monsanto.com."             "mosaicco.com."            
## [269] "motorolasolutions.com."    "mscdirect.com."            "murphyoilcorp.com."        "nasdaqomx.com."           
## [273] "navistar.com."             "nbty.com."                 "ncr.com."                  "netapp.com."              
## [277] "newfield.com."             "newscorp.com."             "nike.com."                 "nov.com."                 
## [281] "nrgenergy.com."            "ntenergy.com."             "nucor.com."                "nustarenergy.com."        
## [285] "o-i.com."                  "oaktreecapital.com."       "ocwen.com."                "omnicare.com."            
## [289] "oneok.com."                "oneok.com."                "onsemi.com."               "outerwall.com."           
## [293] "owens-minor.com."          "owens-minor.com."          "oxy.com."                  "packagingcorp.com."       
## [297] "pall.com."                 "parexel.com."              "paychex.com."              "pcconnection.com."        
## [301] "penskeautomotive.com."     "pepsico.com."              "pfizer.com."               "pg.com."                  
## [305] "polaris.com."              "polyone.com."              "pplweb.com."               "principal.com."           
## [309] "protective.com."           "publix.com."               "qg.com."                   "questdiagnostics.com."    
## [313] "quintiles.com."            "rcscapital.com."           "realogy.com."              "regmovies.com."           
## [317] "rentacenter.com."          "republicservices.com."     "rexnord.com."              "reynoldsamerican.com."    
## [321] "reynoldsamerican.com."     "rgare.com."                "roberthalf.com."           "rpc.net."                 
## [325] "rushenterprises.com."      "safeway.com."              "saic.com."                 "sandisk.com."             
## [329] "scana.com."                "scansource.com."           "seaboardcorp.com."         "selective.com."           
## [333] "selective.com."            "sempra.com."               "servicemaster.com."        "servicemaster.com."       
## [337] "servicemaster.com."        "sjm.com."                  "sm-energy.com."            "spectraenergy.com."       
## [341] "spiritaero.com."           "sprouts.com."              "spx.com."                  "staples.com."             
## [345] "starbucks.com."            "starwoodhotels.com."       "statestreet.com."          "steelcase.com."           
## [349] "steeldynamics.com."        "stericycle.com."           "stifel.com."               "stryker.com."             
## [353] "sunedison.com."            "sungard.com."              "supervalu.com."            "symantec.com."            
## [357] "symantec.com."             "synnex.com."               "synopsys.com."             "taylormorrison.com."      
## [361] "tdsinc.com."               "teamhealth.com."           "techdata.com."             "teledyne.com."            
## [365] "tempursealy.com."          "tenethealth.com."          "teradata.com."             "tetratech.com."           
## [369] "textron.com."              "thermofisher.com."         "tiaa-cref.org."            "tiffany.com."             
## [373] "timewarner.com."           "towerswatson.com."         "treehousefoods.com."       "tribunemedia.com."        
## [377] "trimble.com."              "trinet.com."               "trueblue.com."             "ugicorp.com."             
## [381] "uhsinc.com."               "ulta.com."                 "unifiedgrocers.com."       "unisys.com."              
## [385] "unum.com."                 "usfoods.com."              "varian.com."               "verizon.com."             
## [389] "vfc.com."                  "viacom.com."               "visa.com."                 "vishay.com."              
## [393] "visteon.com."              "wabtec.com."               "walmart.com."              "wecenergygroup.com."      
## [397] "wecenergygroup.com."       "west.com."                 "westarenergy.com."         "westlake.com."            
## [401] "westrock.com."             "weyerhaeuser.com."         "wholefoodsmarket.com."     "williams.com."            
## [405] "wm.com."                   "wnr.com."                  "wpxenergy.com."            "wyndhamworldwide.com."    
## [409] "xerox.com."                "xpo.com."                  "yrcw.com."                 "yum.com."                 
## [413] "zoetis.com."

And, even go so far as to see what are the most popular third-party mail services:

incl <- suffix_extract(sort(unlist(spf_includes(f1k$data))))
incl <- data.frame(table(paste(incl$domain, incl$suffix, sep=".")), stringsAsFactors=FALSE)
incl <- head(arrange(incl, desc(Freq)), 20)
incl <- mutate(incl, Var1=factor(Var1, Var1))
incl <- rename(incl, Service=Var1, Count=Freq)
 
gg <- ggplot(incl, aes(Service, Count))
gg <- gg + geom_bar(stat="identity", width=0.75)
gg <- gg + scale_x_discrete(expand=c(0,0))
gg <- gg + scale_y_continuous(expand=c(0,0), limits=c(0, 250))
gg <- gg + coord_flip()
gg <- gg + labs(x=NULL, y=NULL, 
                title="Most popular services used by the F1000",
                subtitle="As determined by SPF record configuration")
gg <- gg + theme_hrbrmstr(grid="X", axis="y")
gg <- gg + theme(plot.margin=margin(t=10, l=10, b=20, r=10))
gg

Fullscreen_4_11_16__1_10_AM

### Fin

There are more `TXT` records to play with than just SPF ones and many other hidden easter eggs. I need to add a few more functions into `gdns` before shipping it off to CRAN, so if you have any feature requests, now’s the time to file a [github issue](https://github.com/hrbrmstr/gdns/issues).

It’s usually a good thing when my and infosec worlds collide. Unfortunately, this time it’s a script that R folk running on OS X can use to see if they are using a version of XQuartz that has a nasty vulnerability in the framework it uses to auto-update. If this test comes back with the warning, try to refrain from using XQuartz on insecure networks until the developers fix the issue.

**UPDATE**

Thanks to a gist prodding by @bearloga, here’s a script to scan all your applications for the vulnerability:

library(purrr)
library(dplyr)
library(XML)
 
read_plist <- safely(readKeyValueDB)
safe_compare <- safely(compareVersion)
 
apps <- list.dirs(c("/Applications", "/Applications/Utilities"), recursive=FALSE)
 
# if you have something further than this far down that's bad you're on your own
 
for (i in 1:4) {
  moar_dirs <- grep("app$", apps, value=TRUE, invert=TRUE)
  if (length(moar_dirs) > 0) { apps <- c(apps, list.dirs(moar_dirs, recursive=FALSE)) }
}
apps <- unique(grep("app$", apps, value=TRUE))
 
pb <- txtProgressBar(0, length(apps), style=3)
 
suppressWarnings(map_df(1:length(apps), function(i) {
 
  x <- apps[i]
 
  setTxtProgressBar(pb, i)
 
  is_vuln <- FALSE
  version <- ""
 
  app_name <- sub("\\.app$", "", basename(x))
  app_loc <- sub("^/", "", dirname(x))
 
  to_look <- c(sprintf("%s/Contents/Frameworks/Autoupdate.app/Contents/Info.plist", x),
               sprintf("%s/Contents/Frameworks/Sparkle.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Info.plist", x),
               sprintf("%s/Contents/Frameworks/Sparkle.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Autoupdate.app/Contents/Info.plist", x))
 
  is_there <- map_lgl(c(sprintf("%s/Contents/Frameworks/Sparkle.framework/", x), to_look), file.exists)
 
  has_sparkle <- any(is_there)
 
  to_look <- to_look[which(is_there[-1])]
 
  discard(map_chr(to_look, function(x) {
    read_plist(x)$result$CFBundleShortVersionString %||% NA
  }), is.na) -> vs
 
  if (any(map_dbl(vs, function(v) { safe_compare(v, "1.16.1")$result %||% -1 }) < 0)) {
    is_vuln <- TRUE
    version <- vs[1]
  }
 
  data_frame(app_loc, app_name, has_sparkle, is_vuln, version)
 
})) -> app_scan_results
 
close(pb)
 
select(arrange(filter(app_scan_results, has_sparkle), app_loc, app_name), -has_sparkle)

`iptools` is a set of tools for working with IP addresses. Not just work, but work _fast_. It’s backed by `Rcpp` and now uses the [AsioHeaders](http://dirk.eddelbuettel.com/blog/2016/01/07/#asioheaders_1.11.0-1) package by Dirk Eddelbuettel, which means it no longer needs to _link_ against the monolithic Boost libraries and *works on Windows*!

What can you do with it? One thing you can do is take a vector of domain names and turn them into IP addresses:

library(iptools)
 
hostname_to_ip(c("rud.is", "dds.ec", "ironholds.org", "google.com"))
 
## [[1]]
## [1] "104.236.112.222"
## 
## [[2]]
## [1] "162.243.111.4"
## 
## [[3]]
## [1] "104.131.2.226"
## 
## [[4]]
##  [1] "2607:f8b0:400b:80a::100e" "74.125.226.101"           "74.125.226.102"          
##  [4] "74.125.226.100"           "74.125.226.96"            "74.125.226.104"          
##  [7] "74.125.226.99"            "74.125.226.103"           "74.125.226.105"          
## [10] "74.125.226.98"            "74.125.226.97"            "74.125.226.110"

That means you can pump a bunch of domain names from logs into `iptools` and get current IP address allocations out for them.

You can also do the reverse:

library(magrittr)
library(purrr)
library(iptools)
 
hostname_to_ip(c("rud.is", "dds.ec", "ironholds.org", "google.com")) %>% 
  flatten_chr() %>% 
  ip_to_hostname() %>% 
  flatten_chr()
 
##  [1] "104.236.112.222"           "dds.ec"                    "104.131.2.226"            
##  [4] "yyz08s13-in-x0e.1e100.net" "yyz08s13-in-f5.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f6.1e100.net" 
##  [7] "yyz08s13-in-f4.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f0.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f8.1e100.net" 
## [10] "yyz08s13-in-f3.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f7.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f9.1e100.net" 
## [13] "yyz08s13-in-f2.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f1.1e100.net"  "yyz08s13-in-f14.1e100.net"

Notice that it handled IPv6 addresses and also cases where no reverse mapping existed for an IP address.

You can convert IPv4 addresses to and from long integer format (the 4 octet version of IPv4 addresses is primarily to make them easier for humans to grok), generate random IP addresses for testing, test IP addresses for validity and type and also reference data sets with registered assignments (so you can see allocated IP groups). Plus, it includes `xff_extract()` which can help identify an actual IP address (helpful when connections come from behind proxies).

We can’t thank Dirk enough for cranking out `AsioHeaders` since it means there will be many more network/”cyber” packages coming for R and available on every platform.

You can find `iptools` version `0.3.0` [on CRAN](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/iptools/) now (it may take your mirror a bit to catch up), grab the source [release](https://github.com/hrbrmstr/iptools/releases/tag/v0.3.0) on GitHub or check out the [repo](https://github.com/hrbrmstr/iptools/), poke around, submit issues and/or contribute!

Isn’t it great when an R package can help you with resolutions in the new year?

Gone are the days when one had a single computer plugged directly into a modem (cable, DSL or good ol’ Hayes). Even the days when there were just one or two computers connected via wires or invisible multi-gigahertz waves passing through the air are in the long gone by. Today (as you’ll see in the February 2016 [OUCH! newsletter](http://securingthehuman.sans.org/resources/newsletters/ouch/2016)), there are scads of devices of all kinds on your home network. How can you keep track of them all?

Some router & wireless access point vendors provide tools on their device “admin” pages to see what’s connected, but they are inconsistent at best (and usually pretty ugly & cumbersome to navigate to). Thankfully, app purveyors have jumped in to fill the gap. Here’s a list of free or “freemium” (basic features for free, advanced features cost extra) tools for mobile devices and Windows or OS X (if you’re running Linux at home, I’m assuming you’re familiar with the tools available for Linux).

### iOS

– Fing –
– iNet – Network Scanner –
– Network Analyzer Lite – wifi scanner, ping & net info –

### Android

– Fing – (google); (amazon)
– Pamn (google); (direct source)

### Windows

– Advanced IP Scanner
– Angry IP Scanner –
– Fing –
– MiTec Network Scanner –
– nmap –

### OS X

– Angry IP Scanner –
– Fing –
– IP Scanner –
– LanScan –
– nmap –

Some of these tools are easier to work with than others, but they all install pretty easily (though “Fing” and “nmap” work at the command-line on Windows & OS X, so if you’re not a “power user”, you may want to use other tools on those platforms). In most cases, it’s up to you to keep a copy of the output and perform your own “diffs”. One “pro” option for tools like “Fing” is the ability to have the tool store scan results “in the cloud” and perform this comparison for you.

Drop a note in the comments if you have other suggestions, but _vendors be warned_: I’ll be moderating all comments to help ensure no evil links or blatant product shilling makes it to reader eyeballs.