Speaker: Juhaniu Eronen
“The Autoreporter Project” - Background
Goal: make finland mostly harmless to the rest of the internet
(that’s actually in the law - Protection of Privacy in Electronic Comms/Finland)
/me: I’ll need to put some verbiage around this tonight to give you a good picture of what Juhaniu was conveying…really good description of their charter, goals, challenges, successes
What’s a “finnish” system:
- any autonomous systems in finnish soil, operated or owned by finnish orgs
- .fi .ax domains
- +358 telephone prefix
- other networks owned by finnish orgs
- finnish banks/brands/CC
Telcos mandated to report infosec incidents as well as major faults affecting users, networks or provider ability to operate
Regulation for finnish security providers: Basic security of facilities & processes, Business continuity, spam blocking
- Setup mandatory reporting for ISPs
- Establish CERT-FI
Issues
Problem: Finland cleans up its own house, but they still end up getting attacked!
Problem: Most incidents are out of scope in mandated reporting
Problem: Establishing CERT-FI - no ownership or visibility of network; 3 ppl that in theory are expected to be there 7x24!
Huge increase in incidents [reported] from 2002-2006. It’s a pretty graph, but it really shows that the CERT-FI workforce increased and that processes were honed
How many incidents affect finnish networks?
How are we compared to neighbors (would love to take a data-driven jab at swedes).
So, workforce, regulatory and other constraints & need for actionable data == make automated system.
2006: created automated system to capture incident reports (mostly malware) from various monitoring projects around the globe.
Daily reports, e-mailed, CSV format pre-defined agreed-upon subjects. digitally signed. reported incidents in body.
How CERT-FI handles abuse:
- detection
- reports (e-mail/phone/fax) - Funny story: one woman printed out all the spam she received and sent to CERT-FI, until asked not to anymore.
- Scraping feeds, normalizing/correlating data
- Finding owners
- -Map bad events to netblocks
- -maintain contact list (& contact prefs!)
- -manage customer expectations
- Report out stats, trends, chronic cases
- Assist in incident response
There are dozens of projects, data sources, blacklists etc but they vary in format (even timestamps), purpose, channel (IRC, http, ftp)
- data is frequently missed due to downtime, system availability
- info integrity is difficult to gauge
- bugs in feeds data & reporting
- wildly differing frequency of updates (realtime to monthly)
- taxonomies are diverse
- detail level not discrete
Ensuring Focus of CERT-FI
- What are we not seeing?
- What should I prepare for?
- Who is the target of damage & who is just collateral
- Can the data/sources be trusted?
[side-talk: CERT-FI manages intake and the privacy laws make it difficult to delegate collection to the ISPs]
[side-talk: 5.5 mill population of finland, very high # of folks with internet access, everyone has a cell phone. internet considered a basic human right]
CERT-FI shows ISP incident graphs in comparison to other ISPs. /me: the embarrassment factor is a good motivator
interesting: conficker is still a problem
CERT-FI autoreporter can actually report out incidents per broadband customer (trending)
Abusehelper: http://code.google.com/p/abusehelper/wiki/README
Abuse Helper is toolkit for CERT and Abuse teams. It is a modular, (hopefully) scalable and robust framework to help you in your abuse handling.
With Abuse Helper you can:
-
Retrieve Internet Abuse Handling related information via several sources which are
- near-real-time (such as IRC)
- periodic (such as Email reports), or
- request/response (such as HTTP).
-
You can then aggregate that information based on different keys, such as AS numbers or country codes
-
Sent out reports in different formats, via different transports and using different timings
Abuse Helper features include:
- Fully modular (you can utilize different readers, parsers, transports, splitters, combiners in a pipe-like manner)
- Scalable: you can distribute the work to different machines and different geolocations
- Observable: you can use your favourite XMPP client to observe the bots at work
Great overall presentation for the rationale to report incidents outside your org
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