Speaker: Jennifer Bayuk
Based on work for Stevens Institute of Technology.
How do professional systems engineers work?
History:
- Mainframe
 - physical security (punch cards)
 - cables to terminals
 - network to workstations (some data moves there & on floppies) *spike in misuse & abuse
 - modems and dedicated links to external providers/partners
 - added midrange servers (including e-mail)
 - added dial-back procedures to modem
 - e-mail & other issues begat firewalls
 - firewalls begat the “port 80” problem
 - modems expanded to the remote access issue
 - remote access issue begat multi-factor auth
 - then an explosion of midrange begat more malware
 - internal infestation from web sites & more e-mail
 - added proxy servers
 - made anti-virus ubiquitous
 - kicked in SSL on web servers that now host critical biz apps
 - (VPN sneaks in for vendors & remote access)
 - more customers begat identity management
 - increasing attacks begat IDS
 - formalized “policies” in technical security enforcement devices
 - now we have data & access everywhere, begets log management
 - data loss begat disk encryption on servers & workstations
 - increasingly common app vulns begat WAFs
 
Reference: Stevens Inst. “systems thinking”
Use systemogram to show what systems are supposed to do (very cool visualization for differing views of “security systems thinking”)
applied that systemogram model to a real world example of Steven’s school computer lab
Shows the “Vee Model” (her diagram is more thorough – GET THE PRESENTATION)
Advantages of this approach include:
- Manage complexity
 - Top-down requirements tracing
 - Black box modeling
 - Logical flow analysis
 - Documentation
 - Peer review
 - Detailed Communication
 
Must advance and move beyond threat->countermeasure insidious cycle.
Traditional requirements process involves gathering functional requirements, interface definition and system-wide “ilities” – need to get it in before the interface level (high-level “black box”)
The major vulnerabilities are at the functional decompositional level
Many security vulns are introduced at the interface level as well
Unfortunately, it’s usually put at the system-wide level (as they do with availability ,etc)
What Do Security Requiremens Look Like Today?
- Functional – what is necessary for mission assurance
 - Nonfunctional: what is necessary for system survival
 - V&V: what is necessary to ensure requirements are met
 
V&V: Verification: did we build it right? Validation: was it built right? (akin to correctness & effectiveness)
There are more similarities than system architects really want to believe or understand.
Much of security metrics are really verification vs validation
Validation Criteria
- content
 - face
 - criterion
 - construct